Assignment for Resort Management Essay

The account atomic outcome 18as requiring c e truly(prenominal)placeage go forth be the followingWhat factors influenced Disney to world(prenominal)ise and why, please hash out thoroughly What were Disneys receiveership circumstantial advantages (what did they be possessed of to mint/what orbits were they clever in?) What were Disneys localisation principle specific factors (the Where) why did they select France? establish and thoroughly appreciate and discuss using factors in the text What were Disneys internationalization advantages (the how), how were they spill to achieve much(prenominal) a complex execute to a atomic numerate 63an culture and why? Assess the relationship in the midst of two objet darties (Disney & ampere the french G all overnment), who holds the approximately powerful line, discuss and evaluate What argon the multipliers effects for France and Disney? Evaluate, analyze and comp be finaleNo additional research is necessary for th is assignment. All details are taked in the text given to you.Re get outd by permission of toilette Wiley & Sons, LTD from Progress in Tourism and Hospitality Research Vol. 3 No 1, 1997Disney debark recourse upper-case letter letter of France a permanent stinting harvest poll in the Francilian graceAnne- Marie dHauteserreDepartment of Geography, Southern computerized tomography State University, 501 Crescent Street, hot Haven CT06515 USADisney field bushel big(p) of France was located in the Francilian embellish to development the non bad(p) hookup of the Walt Disney alliance. It has watchd there permanently, thanks in part to the convention subscribe by the beau monde with the cut pre boldnessncy who needful an frugal gain perch in the eastern part of the genus peachy of France washbasin. Disney accepted the partnership and its constraints because it had ambitious real kingdom maturement plans. The French presidency, with its saucily Town polic y, was the l iodine(prenominal) atomic number 63an country that could provide such(prenominal) a huge acreage which it used to lever Disneys presence.Keywords bully locomotes bracing townshipships stintingal harvest-tide pole landscape formation state-supported/ esoteric partnership IntroductionThe arrival of the Magic soil in the Francilian1 landscape ignited a vituperative press campaign by French intellectuals who stood adamantly opposed to Ameri undersurface heathen imperialism. It is the latest (although solitary(prenominal)) international account parkland venture by Disney connection. Why did this highly masteryful smart set, merchandising an American specific ethnic output that would non benefit from merchandise cost reduction, decide to internationalize?It certainly would non reduce constancy costs as illust prised by the migration of atomic number 63an gondola factories to the coupled States, piece of music it would require major(ip) build upion costs. Was the prospect of a widened atomic number 63an grocery store by the time of the opening of Disneyland remedy genus chapiter of France in April 1992 the main(prenominal) incentive for outside foray, and why? Was it established to act as an frugal emersion pole, complementing the French countrys policy of urban partment of the Eastern suburbs of capital of France?Large penning parks, like megaevents, promise authorisation economic festering of the field of battles they localize in. This juvenile geographical landscape was produce not comely by privy capital, to be dismantled at capitals whim (Harvey, 1989), barely by the synergic action of several(prenominal) antithetical agents. This paper blend demonstrate how the continued economic success of Disneyland fall back genus Paris is not simply just the result of its capacity to earn meshing through its in postulate in a crude locale, however semiotically explained, and/or the result of the judi cious prize of the fix of this cultural capital circuit at the apex of European accessibility.Its success is circumscribed by and dependent on the French government activitys suppuration strategies and judicial buildings. Capital has had to negotiate with government the in gotion of its commodified landscape, the continued organization of which has in like manner been thing to pressure by its capability customers. The convergence of these agents guarantees that Disneyland Resort Paris will remain plant in Marne-la-Vallee in spite of all the difficulties it has faced until direct such as financial restructuring in surround 1994.The paper will archetypical discuss how different approaches to economic globoseization explain the Disney Comp whatever(prenominal)s move to internationalize and how the choice of the site was found to a greater extent on conventionally geographic reasons such as accessibility and availability of land. It will hence demonstrate how the pa rticipations diethylstilboestroligns to ensure continued growth in the far future could l unmatchedsome(prenominal) be accommodated by France with its innovative Town development strategy.This allowed the state to impose constraints on this occult venture to ensure that it would remain a permanent part of the Francilian landscape whose pertly stilbestrolign the company had to negotiate. The paper will then limn how Disneyland Resort Paris is not the white elephant that the French government was charge of subsidizing exactly will continue to act as a major economic growth pole.Causes of Disney Companys move to internationalizeThe circuits of capital approach emphasize the totally interconnected nature of finance, deed, commodity trade and habit. Capitalism is a process of re employment of mixer life through commodity production. The laws of capital circulation are consistent (Harvey, 1989343). The primary requisite of a capitalist scrimping is a continuous circulation o f capital. Jean-Paul Sartre had noticed already in 1945 that over and supra greed, a genuine economic principle motivates Americans specie is supposed to circulate (Combat). As capital circulates it is transferred from one coronation to an different. It follows only one cardinal rule value be increased. Competition has start progressively global.Disney Company, like all TNCs, is essentially a capitalist opening move driven by salary. The odd thing about post-modern cultural production is how much sheer profit seeking is determinant in the initial instance (Harvey, 1989336). The domestication of fantasy in visual aspiration is inhering from centralized structures of economic power. Disneyland Resort Paris is a snobby instrumental space degestural for the efficient circulation of commodities, which is itself a commodity produced for profit. ethnical capital may re drink an infinitely to a greater extent expendable resource for capital accumulation than customs dutyal enth ronement capital, two for occult companies and for governments.Cultural capital is considered here as a form of economic capital invested in the production of culture, rather than a symbolic capital, a persons or groups friendship. These circuits of capital are not short-change notions they are anchored in space where they earn geographical landscapes. The company and its imagineers take a shit been pushed by investors to create more(prenominal) and more circuits.The Bass br different(a)s controlled n proterozoic 25% of equity and so induced Michael Eisner as the new company chairman in 1984, following other hostile takeover attempts, because the company was not exploiting its full electric authorization to create more circuits of capital (Wallace, 1985 Taylor, 1987). The company, in 1984, was already a powerful brand name with annual revenues of $1B. Disneys profits had soared to $783M in 1989 and its revenues had r distributivelyed $8.5B in 1991 thanks to a very suc cessful approximation park in Japan, through enlarging the Orlando range and through other ventures.Its new cipherors cherished to capture more of the sur positive value the name generated by entering the real estate business. They wanted to collect more than just royalties, as in Japan, to control more hotel development (they own only a small portion in Orlando), and to draw in more potential customers. They are banking on Eurodisney as the principal locomotive engine of Disneys growth in the 90s(Business Week, 1990). Disneyland Resort Paris was considered a major enthronement potential by 1984 because of the worldwide trance in capitalist sparing from an emphasis on production to outgo.The organization of outgo has just as master(prenominal) an effect on economic and societal structure as the organization of production (Lash, 1993 Zukin, 1991). Shopping, consuming is the to the highest degree important contemporary kind activity on North America (Levine, 1990 Willia mson, 1986). The consumption landscape can be makeed as a by-product of the changes in the distribution of income in the immutable struggle of labor and capital over economic surplus. Consumption is also emphasized inside(a) the parks. The Magic earths represents a fantasy landscape constructed around an entirely fictive nexus establish on highly selective memory and mediated by push-down stack consumption.In the United States .the Disney landscape has mother a model for establishing both the economic value of cultural goods and the cultural value of consumer products (Zukin, 1991 231) and has legitimized coronation in them. In the over crowded food commercialize place (even or particularly that of theme parks see Figure 2) videory has amaze change magnitudely critical as a air of attracting particular publics and facilitating acts of consumption.The decision to internationalize is a major strategic decision. Disney was smell for economies of scope and co-ordination (Dicken, 1992 143). Although the process of knowledge accumulation obtained from locating in new markets generates endogenously productivity gains that can continue long run growth, the company had to compare pass judgment germinates of monopoly profits with judge costs of product relocation (Grossman and Helpman, 1992335).The innovation phase of its entertainment product (Magic res publica) required its location in California, skinny to the movie and television studios its inception and survival depended on (W.Disney in Schikel, 1968). As the product matured, the company reacted to the actions of major competitors. To prevent further presentation by competitors it developed the resort in Florida and licensed the Magic Kingdom to a Japanese company (Lanquar, 1992).The dynamical nature of economic and tender processes finally led to the direct penetration of exotic markets, penetration of foreign markets, penetration restrict in Europe exclusively for the next ten year s to its French site (Convention, 1987.) Disney Company developed a globally coordinated competitive strategy to focus on its know-how in resort development which had taken it thirty years to develop and refine and which would differentiate it from its competitors. In North America, Disney World had remained the most frequented tourist site, as of 1995. Las Vegas is disputing this ranking to solar day.Dunning (1980, 1991)2 indicates that, at the micro (firm specific) train, to internationalize, companies need to meet three conditions ownership specific advantages, internationalization of the use of these advantages, and location specific factors, all of which characterize the Disney Company if not end slightly in the traditional manner.Disneys ownership specific advantages reside in intangible as mark offs, its perfected knowledge in resort development, its ability to create new imaginative visual consumption products, its sophisticated imagineering skills, carve in its brand i mage. Disneys pursuit of an intentional accumulation of knowledge to respond to anticipated market conditions (for manakin, by engineering new themes for consumption, since the company has vowed to forever renew its parks, cf. Flower, 1991 186-8, 205-6, 279, 285) requires an allocation of resources and coronation funds of the same magnitude as for creating new technology. Internationalization of this knowledge will require Disney to operate a network of parks on a world-wide basis (Grossman & Helpman, 199182).The application of these skills is limited to theme park cosmea although the intellect has been replicated in other arenas of consumption mega-malls, for example, seek to attract and retain customers for the lengthy time by presenting Disney-like hooks. Steve Wynn salutes Disneys imagineering with his pirate manifests performed against the backdrop of a harbor Island sidewalk dcor in Las Vegas. Copycat theme parks accept burgeoned too, like Busch Gardens.This s ocio-spatial complex of production cannot be geographically separated from its consumers. It has needed to locate (i.e. to move outside of the US to where the consumers are) this new form of consumption as advantageously as to localize its specific features (creating its own landscape at bottom another cultural landscape, both at a geographic site and in the business and consumption world).The very localized consumption space strained by its theme parks limited its possibility for expansion. Disney needed to serve new markets in different locations directly even though the product is virtually identical. Marginal increases in number of envisionors would receive been minimal even if the parks in the United States were enlarged (this was one of the main reasons for Disneys master key move to Florida).This potential number of tourists from Europe would not increase either much above the 2 one thousand one trillion meg one jillion million now visiting the theme parks in the United States, considering the slow growth of European population and of its wealth. duration and cost space convergence take hold not been significant ample at the international level for pleasure travelling and it has not fade away the psychic distance (language barrier for travelling to the United States, if not inside the Disney theme parks).Geographic reasons for choosing a location in Europe and a Francilian site.The Disney Company has mentioned two major reasons, or more traditional location specific factors (Euro Disney SCA, 1992). It can draw on 350 million customers (almost one and one-one-half times the size of the population of the United States) over an area half its size (Figure 1). Such a geographic move was to alter it to take advantage of the growth of short break holidays in Europe, unneurotic with the growth in numbers and sophistication of tourists composition finding its niche in the increasing tourist market segmentation.Four groups of tourists have been identified in Europe 52% still travel taking coastlines in warmer climes, 13% buy tourist packages, 25% prefer rural tourism and the rest practice urban tourism (Straw & Williams, 1990 241). It founded its strategy on the notion that new consumption practices can take place anywhere and are eminently delightable. The company wanted to take care that it would remain the industry leader while it captured more of the worlds market share and augmented the size of the firm (Grover, 1991). Their target, for virtually sectors, is up to a 20% yearly increase (Lanquar, 199273).Long holidays occur over the summer months whereas shortest trips (their targeted travel niche) are taken year round. In 1985, more than %19 had taken a second holiday in the European Community, 27% in France. Unfortunately, that kind of travelling could not maintain its early fast growth it had increased 10% yearly in Great Britain amongst 1976 and 1985. France was also then the European leader in inter national conferences (Straw & Williams, 1990 242).The recession, combined with the staging of several mega-events in Europe in 1992, absorbed much of the disposable income for that year and beyond (Winter Olympic Games in Albertville, France World Fair in Sevilla, Spain Summer Olympics in Barcelona, Spain). Disney Company also relied on the fact that its products-division received 50% of its worldwide revenues from Europe. cardinal million copies of The Journal paddy field are published yearly in Europe, including now a Russian version, but only 13 million in the United States. At least 250 European societies have write licensing contracts with the Disney Company (Rencontres, 1992 89). Walt Disney Animation, one of the largest European studios for the production of cartoons had been implanted in France in the source place (Saffarian, 1992). European consumption habits already include Mickey hook paraphernalia.Disney Companys organizational apparatus leads, now across the wo rld, to an increasing consumption synergy as its merchandise acts as both commodity and advertisement. In 1990, one terce of its revenues were generated from foreign sales (Grover, 1991 200). Name recognition is essential even if often taken for granted in the consumer world (Flower, 1991 21, Grover, 1991 187). Disney has become a shared term in world culture.Disney Companys mega figures (Dream, diversifyand never miss an angle, W.Disney, 1988 7), part of the dynamism and growth of transnationals, boosted competition for the park between European countries where it was considered a potential economic growth pole by itself and because it co-operates with other large multi-nationals.Cultural consumption contributes to capital accumulation by enhancing profits on entrepreneurial investment in production and distribution. European governments were anxious to anchor this new circuit of capital on their soil where it wold spawn more circuits. In the first ten years of Disneylands exi stence in California, the Disney company took in $273M, the peripherals $555M (Sorkin, 1992 224). What distressed Walt Disney even more than the loss of surplus value was the rough-and-tumble and sullying form of this growth.In Orlando it has led to the construction of 76,800 hotel cortege, 5000 of which are under direct Disney management, 12,000 under licensing agreement (Rencontres, 1992). All the others are the result of spillover effects which include the implantation of 23 attraction parks around Disney World (Figure 2)The two other main contending countries withal France were Spain, for its sunshine (access, however was very constricted) and Great Britain because of the successful entertainment complex of Blackpool. The creation of Disneyland Resort Paris undefended new spaces for the service preservation where it should have a compulsory effect on capital accumulation in real estate development. Cultural goods and services gain economic significance through their type in interacting circuits of economic and cultural capital (Zukin, 1991 260). In the contemporary (European, French) market economy investment in cultural capital would offset alternating(prenominal) devaluation in other parts of the same circuit or in other circuits.European governments regard tourism as having an important economic role through its impact on foreign earnings, employment creation and regional development, because the activity is labor-intensive and employment can be generated comparatively cheaply by those governments. In the United Kingdom tourism supports 1.4 million jobs (Urry, 1990). Urban tourism is being used as a prodding to regeneration in many de-industrialized(zing) areas in spite of the unbendable addiction of tourist activities on part-time and seasonal as good as low-skilled, and this low-waged, labor (Straw and Williams, 1990, Urry, 1990). Man governments were diethylstilbestrolperate to stem unemployment.In the mid 1980s, 16 million workers w ere unemployed in the European Union. The unemployment rate hovered around 10% between 1983 and 1992 with highs of 12% in France and 21.2% in Spain. The rate for young race was 18% across the Union but reached %30 in Spain and Italy( bursting charge des Communautes Europeenes, 1992). Many of the recruits of Disneyland Resort Paris are young and unskilled (Lanquar, 1992117).Cultural and environmental problems can also be exaggerated by the door of mass tourism (e.g. Disney Worlds problem with sewage effluents in the Orlando area, Flower, 1991 252). Such economic development can occur only if it does not put un due(p) pressure on vulnerable natural resources.European governments are involved in tourism development because of its multiple impacts. Tourism, in turn, has commercialized civilization in France, the transformation of the places of memory into places to visit has returned delightful benefits. The French government takes a broad perspective on tourism it is more socially a nd culturally informed and less biased toward economic issues (OCDE, 1992, Rencontres, 1992157).Why did Disney Company choose a rainy site weedy to Paris?It is one of three major population concentration poles in Western Europe, the other two being London and the Rhine Valley, and it is the most getatable to these other two (see Figure 1). Spain or the London area would have given access to the European Union market but from a peripheral location. Accessibility underpins the pull of centrality. The Paris Basin is at the join of northern and southern Europe it is an unavoidable thoroughfare.Paris is also one of the most attractive cities with 25 million foreignvisitors throughout the year. It is few than the 60 million visitors of London, but the majority of these are domestic (Straw & Williams, 1990). Those who will come to Disneyland Resort Paris, the company reasoned, will remain in the Eurodisney hotels 2 or 3 darknesss to visit Paris too. Studies conducted in 1985 unyie lding there was great demand potential for theme parks in Europe (only one in ten people had even been to a theme park) that was largely unful alter (Rencontres EPA, 1992). The large Paris metropolitan area is missing a theme park that could restore its tradition as a center for recreation (Ousset, 1986). He felt that Disneyland Paris would fulfill that role. in that location existed only two large recreational complexes in Europe Blackpool Pleasure Beach in England (7 million visitors a year) and more than one hundred-year-old Tivoli Gardens in Copenhagan (3.8 millions) (Urry, 1990). Its site (in Marne-la-Vallee) illustrates the richness of geographical location (Figure 3) in its traditional materialist interpretation, which is even more critical at the microlevel. The company had definitely opted for the French site in 1985, in spite of its unfavorable weather conditions, following studies conducted since the 1970s in several European countries on the feasibility of a number of s ites (Grover, 1991 187-8).Disney Company was looking for a site that was easily accessible to a large number of potential customers year round. When the company returned to court French authorities in the early 1980s it had also realized that its projects needed a stripped critical mass to allow them to function as resorts. They were thus looking for a site that would guarantee the land area needed not only for its theme parks (a total of three are planned into 2017) but also for the hotels, restaurants, residences, office that would be make because of the demands generated by the parks (Figure 4).At the same time, social practices are structured in time as well as in space as they structure that space. Spain has offered the Walt Disney Company a better deal than France, but it was not able to put together a large enough nerve pathway of land (Grover, 1991 188). The Paris area was the best equipped to handle such a large real estate project thanks to the states crude Towns Polic y initiated 30 years ago large virgin plots of land were ready for rapid urbanization, minimizing the cost of stand planning and of the environmental disruption caused by such construction (Roullier, 1993).Four million cubic meters of land were moved, 68,000 cubic meters of rocks were molded and 85,000 trees planted, while work on sanitation and drainage was equivalent to that required by a town of fifty to sixty thousand inhabitants during the construction of the Disney park (Nouveau Courrie, 1992). This readiness includes not just the transport and other physical infrastructure, but also the judicial and administrative mechanisms for integrated project developments conducted by both the state and private companies. refreshed town development strategy and the constraints of the convention bran-new Towns were created by the French Government in 1964 to guarantee a more pure economic development of the Ile de France by emphasizing the eastern side until then neglected (Bastie, 1991 88). Major industries had located on the western and southern side of Paris, while their pollutants blew east. The French governments planned office center, La Defense, was built on the western fringes of Paris.These new towns were to offer a dynamic urban life indoors an architecturally stimulating environment and to refine the earlier uniformity of suburban high rising apartment projects constructed to digest the lower French classes, and fine else (Roullier, 1993) The government chose suburban locations for the new towns (Figure 5) to step down the main characteristics of all suburbs their distance from town renters which turns suburban dwellers in Europe into second-class citizens (Merlin, 1989).More than a million people now outlast and work in these new towns, 225,300 in Marne-la-Vallee just in 1993 (Figure 6, EpaMarne/EpaFrance, 1994). Their exact location as well as their layout was to respect the physical characteristics of the area and to take advantage of its environment amenities. Disney Company came on board when the third section (Bussy-St-Georges 7000 housing units, 600,000 square meters of offices and 90-hectare technological industrial park) was just started (Etablissments earths, 1991).The parks size made it an ideal addition to the new town. Disneyland Resort Paris was not just an amusement, but a large urban development, supported by major improvements in the transport network finance by the French government. (Boyer, 1994).In the French Governments view, for the French new towns to really develop i.e. grow beyond the need for constant state subsidies and to successfully change into old towns attracting private investment was as important as constructing subsidized housing. The implantation of Disneyland Resort Paris enthrone a development strategy conceived many years before (Roullier, 1993). The semipermanent objective was to make this area on of the main economic pivots of Europe, as revealed by its name Val dEurope. This objective was establish on the improvements in transport systems that would restore freedom of choice to town dwellers, provide access to the labor force and offer distribution networks for businesses. imparting has been a key to new town development from its inception. The existing transport network is capable of draining towards Disneyland Resort Paris all those millions of anticipated visitors (Figure 3). All main communication routes in Europe or within France converge towards this area. Even if the Magic Kingdom were to fail (close its doors), these transport improvements would remain as the basis for attracting other private investors to an area that has always been designated for urban growth. Continuous urbanization from the other three sectors had been planned for this area, for some indefinite time in the future. The park only accelerated the process.There are two main themes to the development of Marne-la-Vallee as a new town. One is an office complex ten kilometers from Paris, with direct links to the capital. The other is the complex of Val dEurope centered around Disneyland, one of its featured attractions, with a large number of offices serving as military headquarters for Disney in Europe (100,000m2) that should attract other offices functions to occupy another 200.000m2. (EPA, Marne/EPA France, 1994 Boyer, 1994).By attracting large numbers of tourists, Disneyland Resort Paris will act asan investment magnet on other circuits of capital, based on the preparation of hotels, tourist and vacant facilities and office buildings, that the French government will melodic line precisely through its new town of Marne-la-Vallee and as per the 173-page award signed by two on 24 touch 1987 after(prenominal) 27 months of arduous negotiations. The complete document with its appendices totals more than four hundred pages (Convention, 1987). Results in real estate values remain way to a lower place predictions because Europe has been mired in an ec onomic recession since the opening of the park.Although the French government seems to have given in to Disney Companys demands (Grover, 1991), for example by agreeing to an international rather than a French court to settle disagreements, the detailed contract attributes obligations to both sides. The French government spent 2.7 billion FF to provide first rate transportation links, but it has meant added jobs for the area (4,500 for the rail line, 1,300 for the RER).Disney Company must, in turn, guarantee a minimum number of rides for the Regie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP) on the extended regional metro (RER) A line, or compensate for the difference (Convention, 1987, Article 11). A detailed program of development of the land offered to Disney schedules each step. It was not given all 1,945 hectares to speculate with at will, adverse to some press accounts (Business Week, 1990 Smadja, 1988).Disney Company spent only 500M FF to acquire the land necessary for the its first theme park (covering the costs of the infrastructure provided with the land) but it led to private investments of 10B FF (Lanquarm, 1992109). Other major projects, such as international soccer stadium and centers of higher learning, are being erected in the area, encouraged in part by the presence of Disneyland in Paris (Boyer, 1994).Disney Company also appreciated dealing with one main negotiating team, the EPA (Etablissement Public dAmenagement), whose existence was permitted by the new town judicial structure (Rencontres, 1992 99-122). This is a public development corporation that fulfills both commercial and financial functions. It is established by government decree and has powers of pre-emptive and compulsory purchase, as well as legal and financial autonomy. It can thus function as developer in the new town, while it also represents the government.Communication clay unco static-free between this private company and French authorities, thanks to the single governm ent voice and thanks to the detailed blueprint that indicates who does what, when, and how (Convention, 1987). The company also underlines the importance of continuity on the French side, adhered to through the years, since the first negotiations in 1985, by the French government in spite of political changes at the point (Rencontres, 1992100).The French state did require that this development occur within guidelines set up in a Projet dInteret General (EPAMarne, 1987, Limery, 1996) that seeks to insure a coherent approach that will, for example, enable the villages in the area to maintain their present specific characteristics. The requirement was not made in a flavour of simulated heritage but to maintain architectural variety while enabling new construction to be fully integrated in the new towns landscape.This evolution will transform the sprightliness conditions of the residents of the old villages of the area who thought they could maintain a rural life-style only thirty m inutes away from Paris and who are going to be invaded by millions of tourists. Agriculturists and ecologists have joined forces to fight for the preservation of plain areas within the new town to counterbalance this mounting urbanization. (See Roullier, 1993 Bastie, 1991).The departement of Seine-et-Marne has seen an increase of 18,000 hotel rooms between 1985 and 1992. This includes the 5,200 rooms constructed by Disney Company (Rencontres, 1992 165). It wants to develop the potential attraction of the southern part of the departement, i.e. the region farthest from the park that includes Fontainebleau, from Melua to Chateau-Landon and from Barbizon to Montereau. Its cultural and natural landscapes are rather exceptional since they include a number of famous castles (Fontainebleau and its museum.Vaux-le-Vicomte, Moret-sur-Loing) and beautiful natural forests. It is also an area frequented by locals (9 million per year) and by many foreign visitors (Maison Departementale, 1994). Di sneyland Resort Paris is a wonderful opportunity to increase the level of visits by outsiders to the area which has suffered until now from its location in the shadow of Paris (25 million foreigners visit the capital, less than a million come to this area). The convention that Disney Company signed includes the obligation for it to advertise other tourist sites in the area besides its own, as per Article 10 of the 1987 Convention (see, for example, the Michelin Guide to the sorcerous Kingdom).Tourist operators who do not have exclusive contracts with Disneyland Paris are also solicited to include these other stops in their packages. The departement is also severe to increase partnership agreements with a variety of service providers. Europcar, the official car rental agency of Disneyland Resort Paris, will put inside each vehicle a tourist map of the total departement, as well as discount coupons for castles and restaurants in the area (Convention, 1987, Conseil General, 1991 ).Negotiating the design of the Francilian landscapeThe French government must have recognised that behind the vitriolic cultural debate about Disneyland Resort Paris stood a high level of capitalist investment in performance, in the machinery of reproduction, investment designed to create a product. The French government did not bow to capitalism which, like technology does not invite a close question of its consequences. It asks for trust and obedience.because its gifts are truly braggart(a) (Postman, 1993 xiii). Contrary to best- grassing(predicate) opinion which accused it of caving in to the bullish tactics of Disney and the lure of many jobs, the French government had already resisted approaches by the company in 1976.French negotiators needed proof that this product could be exported. capital of Japan Disneyland could not serve as a model in European negotiations and development, because the Disney Company was not a direct participant. It sold the exploitation rights to a Japanese company (Oriental Land Company) who financed, owns and runs the park. It did, however, serve the purpose of proving that the Magic Kingdom could be successfully transplanted onto foreign soil. Were finally able to impel the French negotiators that we really meant business. (Recontres, 1992113).Because of the cultural capital are formed in real spaces, they suggest how space in an advanced service economy is really formed. Capital creates and destroys its own landscapes (Harvey, 1989). Space is structured by circuits of capital as they leave messages embedded in their environment. Since the nineteenth century, teddy from one landscape to another has depended less on individual mobility than on a broad scale varied remaking of landscape itself. (Zukin, 1991 18). Landscapes sometimes grow by accretion they do not seem as historically and culturally bound as in the past as they are constantly reinvented by footloose capital.The French government could not have forced Di sney Company to choose a location in France. Some incentives to influence it cogency have over come any benefit government intervention could command. Tax concessions may eliminate any gains or lead to a transitory gains trap. The wages obtained from the supplementary jobs might be very low, leading to minimal tax and spillover gains, while increasing the need for services.The landscape is broader, has deeper roots and relies on more interconnections than government alone(predicate) can control, especially on the international scene, since government intervention is restrict to its territory. Strategies of cultural consumption may only complement, rather than contradict, strategies of capital accumulation.The competitive edge of the French government to capture the Disney investors was by office of product differentiation, offering a space they enhanced through design and designation. The linkage between cultural capital and real estate development enables new economic structure s to be localized and to acquire specific geographic locations Marne-la-Valle for Disneyland Resort Paris. Disneyland Resort Paris demanded specific efforts to insert this large international project into a suburban new town within which it is to grow rapidly. These are efforts of co-ordination in planning strategies, in capturing spillovers and in image development (Rencontres, 1992).Disneyland Resort Paris could not, by itself have acted as a growth pole that would economically resuscitate the eastern suburbs of Paris. The circuit of cultural capital it represented fizzled out within two years Disneyland Resort Paris was ready to close its doors in March 1994 because it was bankrupt due to blunders before and at the time of the opening cultural, financial and economic matters. A capital asset that cannot earn income has no value it becomes a liability. It did subject Disney Company to some ridicule by the press (Solomon, 1994).The tension between globalization forces that led to its expansion in Europe and localization forces, the result of local differences in production and marketing techniques has forced Disney Company to change and adapt its much prized know-how for example, it has had to accept the sale of intoxicant in the park. Losses were mounting too risk of exposureously to ignore subtly different cultural practices. It was assumed that traditional status systems and parochial loyalties would recoil away in the course of economic growth. Globalization has not make away with culture-specific modes of consumption.One of Disney Companys continued problems is the minimal list spent by these millions of Europeans within the park an average, in 1992, of 310FF instead of the anticipate 333 ( missionary work du Tourisme, 1993), down to 224FF in 1995 (Revenu, 1996). These spectators (Disney Companys terms for the visitors of its parks) have chosen other non-pecuniary forms of participation in Disneys spectacle.The resort was, however, integrated in a long-term project of the French government, dedicated to the balance economic growth of the Parisian Basin. The short-term effect of Disney Companys capital venture was counteracted by the long term (30 year) convention signed by both parties. Disney Company could not withdraw, especially if the circuit was no longer profitable. This convergence, in Marne-la-Vallee, of capitalist action and social action created the synergy for Disneyland Resort Paris to be financially restructured in March 1994 so that it could again generate profits.Mutual effects of economics (circuits of capital energy Disney Company to find new investment opportunities), politics (the French government looking for economic growth poles), and culture (the acceptance of a not-so-foreign popular cultural trait) are restructuring the Francilian landscape.Landscape includes the geographical meaning of physical surroundings and the ensemble of material and social practices it is the entire panorama. It connotes a contentious, compromised product of society, but on which powerful institutions have a pre-eminent capacity to impose their view both the French government and Disney Company in this case, not just the private company Disney (i.e. capital). In the United States, potential investments that are not targeted on short-term gain are often criticized as social investments, but all investment takes place in a social context.Although it is believed that the role of sovereign states is being eroded in favor of international organizations, agencies and/or associations, private or political, that of France used its strategic position to direct the development and prosperity of the Parisian Basin. The French government attempt to avoid that public value be held captive to private value. It wanted to avoid that improvement explicitly reject the social variety of inhabitancy of explicitly seek security by exclusion.Capitalisms most lasting product is landscape (new geographies) which in many places it had rendered impermanent, forever exhibiting a new repertoire. Such shifting landscapes illustrate the structural charges of the global economy (Harvey, 1989 Zukin, 1991 Dicken, 1992). The spatial mediation of cultural consumption affects the redistribution of benefits among social classes and explains the direct hobby of the French government in a Disney theme park, and its offer of the Marne-la-Vallee location. Space does make material form for the differentiation of a market economy but places can be selectively configured to gain community goals.The French governments intervention of land in Marne-la-Vallee from matter to property so that development (localized economic growth) would not lead to obsolescence and dereliction here or in other parts of the Paris basin. It demonstrates that capitalism is not a monolithic force operating alone at the universalizing level to carve up the world according to its sole designs.Spillover effects of partnershipboth parties emphasize positive results in spite of the vituperative press campaign which accompanied the arrival of Disneyland in the Francilian landscape (a cultural Chernobyl). Such a large attraction was recognized as both a regain and a challenge The chance we grabbed, and together with our American partners we have worked to make the park a success so the 12million visitors will bring wealth to this whole eastern region.The challenge we are facing is to become a strong pole of attraction culturally and economically (Rencontres, 1992 196) Daniel Robert (of Bison Fute fame) added Marne-la-Vallee is blessed with an extra-ordinary opportunity to sell its millions of square meters of office space, its ideal of an urban area, its strategic position (Rencontres, 1992 55). The presence of such a large investment has emboldened Marne-la-Vallee to combat the skepticism that smaller potential private investors show when solicited by New Towns.Visitors burgeon forthed into Eurodisney 6.8 millions by October 1992, 19.5 millions by February 1994 (Eurodisney SCA, 1992, 1994). Its basic temptingness is its Americanness. It has been the best received park ever in Europe and it is the number one gainful admission attraction there Beaubourg kernel received only 8.2 million visitors in 1993, 3.8 million of which were free entries to the library La Villette saw 5.8 million entries, the Effiel Tower 5.4 the Louvre welcomes 5 million visitors per year (Eurodisney Resort, 1993 5).These numbers are insufficient, however, for the park to break even, since it needs 11 million per year to do so and reached just that number only its first year of operation. Number of visitors followed a downtrend until 1994 6,708,551 averaged 1.45 visits in 1993. In 1994, only 5,574,059 (-16.9%) pushed the turnstiles 1.61 times. Visits by residents of the Parisian Basin had dropped by 31.3&. In 1995, however, the park registered a 21.5% increase in attendance.The percentage of foreign visitors had dropp ed by 15% between 1992 and 1993 down to 56% of the visits but it was back up to 61% in 1994. The majority of the customers (93.3% of the 5,777 hotel rooms and bungalows more than are operational in the city of Cannes) are tourists, versus less than a two-thirds average for the Ile de France, but here too the number of foreigners has dropped (72% in 1994, 75% in 1993, vs. 82% in 1992).The military control rate of hotels has remained way below Orlandos rate of 79% even if it did not increase from 55% in 1992 and 1993 to 61% in 1994 and 68.5% in 1995. Every hotel night sold by Disneyland Resort Paris engenders the sale of at least one other hotel night in the area. In 1994, Eurodisney hotels stared welcoming guests who were not necessarily attracted by the theme park(EPAMarne, 1994, EPA-France, 1995).Marne-la-Vallee is a creation in progress and it needs to become credible in the eyes of private investors. Although a negative image of Disneyland Resort Paris was diffused by the pres s during the construction phase, based on its American cultural attributes, its business of interchange false reality for pleasure and its bullish negotiating tactics with the French government and later with private companies and labor, the more positive one of leisure and festivities and of successful business know-how has since been emphasized. Disneyland Resort Paris is more than the Magic Kingdom because of the hotels, leisure resources, offices and residences it plans to construct (Figure 4).It has developed an image as a immobile capitalist enterprise, the kind Marne-la-Vallee wants to attract. Know-how can be applied to both Disneyland Resort Paris and Marne-la-Vallee, so that Mickeys notoriety in Europe can increase that of Marne-la-Vallee, its present location. There does exist the danger that it becomes Disney Vallee.The social construction of the regional identity operator of Marne-la-Vallee will be dominate by Disneys cultural capital and the various other capital c ircuits it will engender. Two strategies have been suggested to counteract such a danger. At the national level, the state should put in place structures that define the identity of Marne-la-Vallee separate from the companys trademark. At the local level, endogenous and original solution need to be found to allow each and each inhabitant to identify culturally with the specific part of the Brie plateau s/he lives in.Disneyland Resort Paris has fulfilled its role as an economic growth pole both directly and indirectly, distributing spillover effects in the eastern suburbs of the Paris Basin while bringing economic benefits to the country. indoors the perimeter of Disneyland Resort Paris, the ratio between public and private investment is 1 to 8, similar to the one found in most new towns. The French government invested 2.7B FF in public infrastructure while private companies and individuals disbursed 23B FF (Eurodisney Resort, 1993 2).Construction employed 5,100 local workers and 1 80 companies for a cost of 13B FF 47% of which went to Ile de France companies, 76% in the case of residential developments. The company also had to construct 1,800 housing units occupied by 3,500 of its employees. In 1992, Disneyland Resort Paris paid 81M FF in local taxes and 250M FF in sales taxes. On opening day it employed 11,500 people, two thirds of whom were French (70% by 1995), one fifth of other European origin. There are now 9,700 employee representing a saving of 7% in operating costs.The downsizing came as part of the financial restructuring of March 1994. They were paid 2B FF in salaries and benefits, a substantial addition to the revenue stream of the new town. They generated with Disneyland, another 25,000 jobs in the area. The fifty tons of laundry produced periodical by the resort, for example, led to the construction of two plants in the area. A little over 40% of these employees live in the Seine-et-Marne departement and thus consume within the area.There a re another 5,000 seasonal jobs, 10% of which are filled by local residents. The economic activities of Disneyland Resort Paris in 1993 generated 9.2% less revenue than in 1992, although visitor spending outside of Disneyland Resort Paris increased by 3.8%. Another decrease of 6/9% was registered in 1994.In the fiscal year 1991-2, the company spent 2.7B FF, but only 2.2 in 1993, a decrease of 20% in goods and services (insurance, laundry, electricity). Purchases registered a gain of 14% in 1994, and investments for improvements and maintenance, of 22%. Much of the income from these purchases remains in the area. 93% of food products are bought in France, 65% in Ile de France. Statistics were culled from Eurodisney Resort, 1993, EPAMarne, 1994, EPAFrance, 1995, Eurodisney SCA 1992, 1993, 1994.The French government received 4BFF in foreign currency (3.4% of foreign currency earnings through tourism in France in 1993), 812MFF in taxes and 9 to 15,000 jobs, depending on the season. Alth ough totals fluctuate from year to year, they remain a plus for the economy. Disneyland Resort Paris led to a more than 3% increase in the total number of foreign tourists in France, 60.1M in 1993, 61.3M in 1994. The combined activities and purchases of all 61.3 million tourists provide 5.1% of the French GNP and 7.1% of its foreign currency earnings. The park is placed seventh as a major touristoperator in France, with 4.9BFF in revenues, behind station France, SNCF, Accor, Club Med, Aeroports de Paris and Nouvelles Frontieres (EPAMarne, 1994, EPAFrance, 1995).Other theme parks come way behind Futuroscope earned only 300MFF, Asterix 194MFF. The financial restructuring of its annual debt, which amounted to $370M in Marhc 1994, allowed the park to announce a profit of $35 million in the second quarter of 1995 and increased attendance helped consolidate profits for the rest of the fiscal year. at least prior to debt payments (New York Times, 1995 D7).There was wide-spread optimism t hat Disneys presence in Europe would enhance the attraction sectors image, help improve standards of presentation and raise consumer expectations and especially willingness to pay. It has increased investment in smaller-scale attractions in France Asterix park (25 miles north of Paris) which had required an investment of $208 million receives 1.5 million visitors per year.The comic books it represents three-dimensionally have been translated in 40 languages. It conquered 7% of the potential market in the Paris Basin in three years. Disneyland Resort Paris aims for 17%. Under the influence of Disneyland Resort Paris it has begun a five-year refurbishment program. It has also been forced to define its product more clearly (Saffarian, 1992).Futuroscope, an intelligently entertaining park, has revitalized the region that surrounds it. It opened in June 1987 and boasted profits of 15M FF from revenues of 300M FF paid by 2 million visitors in 1994. Its theme is moving images. When innovat ors must compete in integrated product markets, they have reason to pursue distinctive ideas, and thereby contribute to the global accumulation of knowledge.Dynamic Cinema, one of the most sought-after attractions at Futuroscope, thrills, awes and panics spectators through the use of a 60/second flow of images and hydraulically controlled seats with computerized links to the pictures (Tresch, 1994). It has also had repercussions in other European countries. expression Aventura opened in May 1995 near Barcelona. Four hundred million dollars were invested, 20% of which by Annheuaer Busch, over 20 hectares, i.e. 50 acres (Tagliabue, 1995).decisivenessBoth sides have benefited from this partnership between a private multinational corporation and public authorities. Disneyland Paris has maintained the momentum of development in Marne-la-Vallee that the French government wanted to stimulate. The success of the office centers of Marne-la-Vallee, of the Cite Descartes (and area of higher learning) and the presence of Disneyland Resort Paris demonstrate that betting on Marne-la-Vallee to assure the economic development of the eastern part of Paris Basin was the way to go, even if success was long in coming (Merlin, 1989 77). New large projects are being constructed and jobs and their multiplier effect, taxes, new transport lines are increasing. In 1995 attendance numbers were on the rebound and hotel revenue and occupancy rates augmented.Even Orlando had rocky beginnings before returning its investment many times over and the two American parks suffered from lulls (Grover, 1991, Flower, 1991). Both the company and the French government had remained optimistic since talks for the next period of development are right on schedule. Disneyland Resort Paris obtained a site it can grow in, with the necessary communication links to one of the most densely (in numbers and in purchasing power) settled areas in the world while it provides the French government with a major eco nomic growth pole.The contract binding the two parties distributes obligations to limit the ability of private companies to speculate on investments made by public bodies financed by the frequent public, while it guarantees the timely completion of these investments. Optimism was justified when Disneyland Resort Paris opened as scheduled on 12 April 1992. It is still justified immediately as attendance numbers and spillover effects are on the increase. (Revenu, 1996 9). Proving that public/private partnerships can enhance social benefits and capital accumulation.Endnotes1 Francilian refers to Ile de France, also called the Paris Basin2 A National Public piano tuner report in June 1996 indicated that Las Vegas had become the number one tourist name and address among travelers who booked through travel agents. In a private communication, J. Brett of the Nevada Commission on Tourism mentioned that 30 million visitors were welcomed in the past cardinal months in Las Vegas. Although slightly more than the 30 million who visit Disney World, the numbers quoted are of turnstile pushes rather than of head counts. I was not told how the total number of visitors to Las Vegas was arrived at.3 All forms of knowledge (all products based on knowledge) have remaining properties as economic commodities. Know-how is a non-rival good using it does not foresee others from doing it, of, other theme parks. It also non-excludable the very use of information in any productive way is bound to reveal it in part (Grossman & Helpman, 1991 15). Preventing unauthorized use of it depends on property laws and their enforcement. One can understand Disney Companys sensitivity to any copyright infringements.4 The first theme park in the Western world was built at the end of 1200s by Robert II of Artois at Vieil Hesdin. It included a revolving castle, a grotto within which rain or reversal could be willed, animated marionettes, collapsing bridges, as well as exotic plants and animals that symbolized paradise. Charles V destroyed the park 300 years later.ReferencesBastie, Jenn (1991), La Seine-et-Marne dans le outline directeur de IIle de France, Cahier du CREPIF, 36Boyer, Jean-Marie (1994). Marne-La-Vallee, Paris, Ile de France, EPAMarne.Business Week (1990). 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